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Abstract
This paper analyses the potential impacts of introducing unemployment insurance (UI)
in middle income countries using the case of Malaysia, which today does not have such
a system. The analysis is based on a job search model with unemployment and three
employment sectors: formal and informal wage employment, and self employment. The
parameters of the model are estimated to replicate the structure of the labor market in
Malaysia in 2009 and the distribution of earnings for informal, formal and self employed
workers. The results suggest that unemployment insurance would have only a modest
negative effect on unemployment if benefits are not overly generous. The main effect
would be a reallocation of labor from wage into self employment while increasing average
wages in the formal and informal sectors.
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1 Introduction
In developing countries, income protection in the case of unemployment is mainly provided through
severance pay, which is regulated by the labor code. These systems cover only a minority of the
labor force, are difficult to enforce, and carry considerable risk of default, particularly during
times of crisis, given that employers seldom provision for the benefits (Holzmann et al., 2011).
Meanwhile, only a few countries have introduced contributory unemployment benefit programs.
Part of the reason is the concern that traditional unemployment insurance systems (or providing
basic unemployment assistance) can lead to abuse, promote unemployment, and generate large
fiscal outlays, particularly in the presence of informal employment and weak institutional capacity
to monitor job-search and employment status.
The empirical evidence, mainly coming from high income countries, is mixed.1 In general,
studies find that there is a positive correlation between the level and duration of benefits and
the length of the unemployment spell, which can lead to higher unemployment rates. At the
same time, evidence from Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland and Spain shows that longer
unemployment spells can also be associated with “better matches”; workers are able to find better
and more stable jobs.(Tatsiramos, 2009)
Less is known about the effects of unemployment insurance in developing countries. The few
studies available would suggest that effects on the duration of unemployment spells and employ-
ment levels are modest. Two studies for Brazil find no quantitatively meaningful effect of the UB
system on the duration of unemployment spells. The first exploited changes in eligibility conditions
and showed that, if anything, unemployment benefits allowed faster transitions into self employ-
ment (Cunningham, 2000). A second compared the exit rates from unemployment among formal
sector workers (eligible for unemployment benefits) and informal sector workers (not eligible for
unemployment benefits). It showed that the former had higher exit rates even after controlling for
unobserved characteristics that are correlated with work in the formal sector (Margolis, 2008). At
the other extreme, van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) show that in the case of Slovenia, the shorten-
ing of the potential duration of UI benefits substantially reduced the length of the unemployment
spell. A more recent paper based on a structural model for Brazil finds the unemployment insurance
system mainly reduces transitions into informal jobs (Robalino et al., 2011).
This paper analyses the potential impacts of introducing an unemployment insurance (UI) sys-
tem in Malaysia, which currently has no such system. The analysis is based on a structural job
search model with unemployment and three employment sectors: formal and informal wage employ-
ment, and self employment. The parameters of the model are estimated to replicate the structure
1For reviews see Holmlund (1998); Vodopivec et al. (2005); and Olinto et al. (2007).
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of the labor market in Malaysia in 2009 and the distribution of earnings for informal, formal and
self employed workers. The model is used to simulate the effects of alternative unemployment
benefit system designs that depend on the replacement rate, the vesting period for benefits, the
duration of benefits, and the contribution rate. We look at changes in the shares of individuals
across employment states, the unemployment rate, and average earnings by sector.
The results suggest that an unemployment insurance system in Malaysia would have only a
modest negative effect on unemployment if benefits are not overly generous. The system would
induce a reallocation of labor from wage into self employment while increasing average wages in
the formal and informal sectors. The effects on the average earnings of the self employed would
depend on the generosity of the system. With a 50% replacement rate, most workers entering self
employment would be low skilled workers, driving average earnings down. High skilled workers
would change behavior significantly with more generous systems. As they remain unemployed for
longer, wage employment offers fall, and a larger share enters self employment, driving up average
earnings among the self employed. Although the analysis focuses on Malaysia, the results are likely
to be relevant for other middle income countries, particularly in Latin America, which share similar
demographic, levels of education and labor market structures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of
the Malaysian labor market, while 3 lays out a 4-state (unemployment, self employment, formal
wage and salary employment, informal wage and salary employment) job search model . Section
4 describes the data used for the estimations, section 5 covers the reduced form and simulated
pseudo method of moments estimation results, while section 6 presents the microsimulation results.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview of Current Malaysian Labor Markets
Over the last decade both employment and labor productivity have been growing in Malaysia.
(see figure 1). Between 2000 and 2008 the adult population grew by an average of 2.6 percent
annually over this period, while employment grew by an average of 2.8 percent per year and labor
productivity grew on average by 3.7 percent.
Similar to middle income countries in Latin America, Malaysia has a young and relatively well
educated working age population. Over 60 percent of the working age population is under 40 years
old, and over 35 percent was under 25 years old.2 About 57 percent of the workforce has some
2In the states of Sabah and Labuan, there are over 5 percent more people under the age of 25 and roughly 4
percent fewer people over the age of 55 than in the other regions. The state of Sarawak differentiates itself from
Peninsular Malaysia in that its demographic bulge happened earlier, so that there are more people in their thirties
and fewer people in their twenties and teens in Sarawak than in Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah/Labuan.
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Figure 1: Working Age Population, Employment
and Labor Productivity Trends, 2000-2008
Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes: Labor productivity is measured as GDP per worker in 1990 USD
converted at PPP rates.
form of secondary education certification and 14.4 percent of the population has a post-secondary
certification, with over 5 percent having a tertiary education degree. However, there are clear
regional disparities; for example, the working age population in East Malaysia, especially the states
of Sabah and Labuan, is much less educated than that of Peninsular Malaysia.3
The differences in compensation, hours worked and formality levels4 among population groups
(sex, region, age, level of education, and sector of activity) are also important (Table 2). Men are
more likely to be in formal jobs (55 percent) than women (48) and also earn more – men’s base
monthly compensation is on average 17 percent higher than women’s. Not surprisingly, education
is an important determinant of labor market outcomes. Only 25 percent of those with primary
education or less are in formal employment against 44 percent for those with secondary education
and 68 percent for those with higher education. One explanation consistent with the model de-
veloped below is that formal contracts are not for low productivity workers, who end-up working
in low productivity activities often in small firms in the informal sector or as self employed. Thus
3Forty percent of the working age population of Sarawak has at most a primary education, while the number rises
to 47 percent for Sabah/Labuan. Conversely, nearly 60 percent of the working age population in Peninsular Malaysia
has a secondary degree (compared with 52 percent in Sarawak and 43.3 percent in Sabah/Labuan) and 15.6 percent
have a post-secondary certification (compared with 8.1 percent in Sarawak and nearly 10 percent in Sabah/Labuan).
4For the purposes of the data work in this report, employment in the “formal sector” is defined as holding a
job for which the employer makes Employer’s Provident Fund (EPF) or Social Security (SOCSO) contributions. By
this definition, self employed individuals who are not required to contribute are considered to be“informal”, and this
definition will also classify some teachers or health workers employed by the public sector as informal, since their
employer is not required to contribute to EPF and SOCSO on their behalf.
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Table 1: Working Age Population
Sabah and
Peninsular Sarawak Labuan Total
General Demographics
Male 50.3 49.4 50.0 50.2
Malaysian Citizen 95.6 96.5 75.6 93.7
Never Married 46.8 42.7 47.3 46.5
Married 48.9 53.4 48.9 49.3
Widowed 3.3 2.7 2.6 3.2
Divorced / Separated 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0
Highest certifcate obtained
Not Applicable 3.6 10.2 13.1 5.1
No Certificate 10 12.8 16 10.8
UPSR/UPSRA or equivalent 11.5 17.1 17.9 12.6
PMR/SRP/LCE 23.9 24.3 20.8 23.7
SPM/MCE 35.3 27.6 22.5 33.4
STPM/HSC or equivalent 2.9 2.4 2.9 2.9
Certificate 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.4
Diploma 5.4 2.3 2.6 4.8
Degree 5.8 2.6 3.4 5.3
Status in employment
Not Employed 49.6 46.3 46.7 49
Employer 2 1.6 1.8 1.9
Government Employee 6.8 6.2 6 6.7
Private Employee 29.7 27 30.4 29.5
Own Account Worker 9.6 12 11.5 10
Unpaid Family Worker 2.3 6.8 3.7 2.8
Age
15-24 37.7 37.2 43.4 38.2
25-39 26.2 25.9 25.8 26.1
40-44 23.3 23.7 21.9 23.2
55-64 12.8 13.1 8.9 12.5
Source: Labor Force Survey 2009.
Note: The Labor Force Survey does not sample collective housing. All figures are percentages using LFS sample
weights.
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there are large difference in earnings: the average worker with higher education earns five times
more than the average worker with primary education or less.
3 The Model Framework
Search and matching models have been extensively used for the analysis of the quantitative effect
of labor market policy. In this paper we adapt the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides style of dynamic
job search model (Pissarides, 2000) to fit the situation of labor markets with large informal sectors.
In this type of model, unemployed individuals engage in job search activity and the decision to
accept a job depends on the value of the job, which is itself a function of the job’s stability and the
opportunity cost of not being able to search for a better job while employed. This sort of model has
been extensively analyzed and some recent extensions of this framework have introduced informal
labor markets and self employment(Albrecht et al., 2009).
This paper continues in this literature by integrating both an informal sector and self employ-
ment, although it does not solve analytically for the equilibrium labor market tightness and the
shares of offers from the formal and informal sector wage employers. Appendix A describes the
basic structure of the model.5 The model defines a set of value functions for different labor market
states and a wage determination mechanism. The model is solved numerically in section 5.
3.1 Unemployment Value Function
Let U (y, w˜) be the value of unemployment for a worker of type y, which can be written as
rU (y, w˜) = b (w˜) + αmax [N0 (y)− U (y, w˜) , 0] +
m (θ)ψEmax [NI (x, y)− U (y) , 0] +
m (θ) (1− ψ)Emax [NF (x, y)− U (y, w˜) , 0] . (1)
This worker receives a flow utility of b (w˜), where w˜ is the wage on the previous job, while unem-
ployed.6,7 At a rate α, the worker meets an opportunity for self employment and, if it is taken,
5See Margolis et al. (2011) for the full structural model with expressions for equilibrium employment rates in each
sector and wage distributions.
6For simplicity of exposition, it is assumed that all ex-workers, including self employed and informal sector workers,
can draw unemployment benefits, as a function of their earnings prior to unemployment. This assumption is relaxed in
the numerical simulations, where the replacement rate for unemployment spells following self employment or informal
wage employment is set to zero.
7It is assumed that individuals can only receive unemployment benefits when unemployed, i.e. not when self
employed or in informal employment. This implies significant enforcement capacity on behalf of he government,
which may not be appropriate. We discuss the implications that relaxing this assumption might have in section 6.
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realizes a capital gain of N0 (y) − U (y, w˜). The matching function m (θ) = aθβ determines the
probability of an individual meeting a vacancy for a wage and salary job, with θ being the ratio of
vacancies to unemployment (i.e. a measure of labor market tightness). Conditional on meeting a
vacancy, a worker meets a formal sector vacancy with probability 1−ψ and an informal sector va-
cancy with probability ψ. If the job is taken, the worker realizes a capital gain of Nj (x, y)−U (y, w˜).
The employment value functions consider that the initial flow value of the match is given by the
sector-specific productivity x, which varies across individuals and sectors (formal and informal).
3.2 Self Employment Value Function
Let N0 (y) be the value of self employment for a worker of type y, which can be written as
rN0 (y) = y + λ0 (U (y, y)−N0 (y)) . (2)
This expression shows that the self employed receives a flow value equivalent to her type y, but
at rate λ0 the opportunity ends in which case there is a (negative) capital gain of U (y, y)−N0 (y).8
3.3 Wage and Salary Sector Value Functions
Let NF (x, y) and NI (x, y) be the values of employment in the formal sector and informal salaried
sector, respectively, for a worker of type y with a draw x from the sector-specific productivity
distribution. The flow values of these jobs can be written as
rNF (x, y) = wF (x, y) + λF (U (y, wF (x, y))−NF (x, y)) (3)
rNI (x, y) = wI (x, y) + λI (U (y, wI (x, y))−NI (x, y)) , (4)
respectively. A worker of type y who has a formal sector job receives a wage wF (x, y) determined
by Nash bargaining. Idiosyncratic shocks that destroy the match and send the individual back to
unemployment arrive at rate λj . A similar idea applies to the value of employment in the informal
wage sector.
8As savings are not a component of the model, it is assumed that taking a self employment opportunity requires
no startup capital.
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3.4 Employer-Side Value Functions
Let Vj and Jj (x, y) be the value of the expected profit of posting a vacancy and the value of a filled
job in sector i ∈ {F, I}. The filled job values can be written as
rJF (x, y) = x− wF (x, y) (1 + τ) + λF (VF − JF (x, y)− s)
rJI (x, y) = x− wI (x, y) + λI (VI − JI (x, y)) .
Regulations affecting the formal sector filled job value are payroll taxes τ and severance payments
s. Note that regulations do not affect JI (x, y) but the flow value of productivity therein is x,
where  < 1.
The values of formal and informal sector vacancies, VF and VI , are defined respectively by
rVI = −c+ m(θ)
θ
Emax[JI(x, y)− VI , 0] (5)
rVF = −c+ m(θ)
θ
Emax[JF (x, y)− VF , 0].
The expectation term in (5) reflects the assumption that the firm does not know in advance which
type of worker it will meet.
3.5 Wages
As standard in this literature, a surplus is realized when a match is formed. This surplus is given by
the net gain from matching for both the firm and the worker, that is, Ns(x, y)−U(y)+Js(x, y)−Vs.
Wages are determined by rent sharing over the surplus of the match. A wage is a solution to
a generalized Nash Bargaining problem with threat points equal to the worker’s and the firm’s
respective continuation values. Given an exogenous share parameter β and the free entry condition
(Vj = 0), the formal contract wage wF (x, y) for a worker of type y producing at x solves
max
wF (x,y)
[NF (x, y)− U(y)]β [JF (x, y) + s]1−β
which implies,
wF (x, y) = β
(x+ rs)
1 + τ
+ (1− β)rU(y). (6)
Similarly, the informal wage wI(x, y) solves
max
wI(x,y)
[NI(x, y)− U(y)]βJI(x, y)1−β,
and the wage function can be written as
wI (x, y) = βx+ (1− β)rU(y). (7)
The wage in sector i is the weighted average of the worker’s productivity and the worker’s
outside options. Of course, regulations affect the formal wage bargaining process.
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4 The Data
The model is estimated on two separate data sources from Malaysia, the Household Income Survey,9
or HIS, and the Labor Force Survey with the Wages and Salaries Supplement,10 or LFS. These data
sources are complementary in that neither source is perfectly suited for estimation of the model
presented in section 3, but the limits of each source can be compensated by the advantages of the
other. Both data sources are thus used to estimate different components of the model, and as both
surveys are designed to be representative of the same population (and sample weights are always
used), no further correction for sampling is necessary11.
4.1 The Household Income Survey (2009)
The HIS is a household survey that is representative of the population of Malaysia that does not
live in collective housing.12 It is comprised of 4 components: basic identification, sociodemographic
characteristics of the household members, basic information on activity status and sources of in-
come.
The HIS is particularly useful for the purposes of this paper because it allows for separate
measurement of income from paid employment and self employment income. In terms of income
from paid employment, the survey distinguishes between the various components and separately
measures employer contributions to social security, pensions, etc. on the worker’s behalf.13 It
does not, however, directly measure the amount received in severance payments.14 In terms of
self employment income, it allows for the separation of total self employment earnings into own
consumption use and income, with the latter being broken into agricultural and non-agricultural
self employment earnings.
There are two main difficulties with using exclusively the HIS for this paper. First, the informa-
tion on labor market status does not specifically designate unemployment as a labor market state.
The available categories are:
9The HIS is collected by the Department of Statistics for the Economic Planning Unit.
10The LFS is collected by the Department of Statistics.
11It should be noted that some variables needed to be built form both sources. See section 5.1 for details.
12The exclusion of collective housing is likely to be an issue for some sectors, particularly agriculture where many
workers live in collective housing in the middle of plantations.
13The actual question asked is “How much did .................. earn during the last twelve (12) months from paid
employment?’ for which one earnings category is “Employer’s contributions to EPF, SOCSO, etc.”.’
14It should be noted that Malaysia does not have an explicit unemployment insurance system, however it does
provide for mandatory severance pay in the case of dismissal or redundancy-based separation from (formal) jobs
(Holzmann and Vodopivec, eds, 2011).
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1. Employer
2. Government employee
3. Private employee
4. Own account worker
5. Unpaid family worker
6. Housewife / Looking after home
7. Student
8. Child not at school
9. Others (specify)
It is therefore impossible to calculate the share of the work force in each state as defined by out
model, unless one assumes that all codes other than 1-4 are unemployed.
Second, the survey collects data referring to the previous year’s values, so the questions on
activity status are phrased as
What did ......... (usual member) ......... do MOST OF THE TIME during the last
twelve (12) months?
and the income questions refer to all income received during the previous year. There is no calendar,
so it is impossible to know whether a low amount of earnings is due an individual working part
of the year or being poorly paid for a full year of work. Moreover, and more importantly for the
estimation of the model in section 3, it is impossible to measure the length of employment and
unemployment spells.
4.2 The Labor Force Survey with the Wages and Salaries Supplement (2009)
The LFS is a standard labor force survey, focusing on the working age population that does not live
in collective housing. The LFS has 3 components: identification, household member characteristics
and labor force particulars. The wages and salaries supplement provides additional information on
income for government and private employees only.
The main advantage of the LFS over the HIS is that its “labor force particulars” component
is more thorough than that of the HIS. Questions are asked relative to the reference week, ILO-
standard unemployment definitions are used, and there is enough information to calculate the
distribution of unemployment durations within the stock of unemployed.15
Unfortunately, the income component of the LFS is not as rich as the HIS. In particular, there is
no information on earnings from any source other than wages, salaries and overtime payments. This
implies that the data cannot be used for estimating y directly, as self employment earnings cannot
15Unemployment durations are measured as: less than 3 months, 3 months - less than 6 months, 6 months - less
than 1 year, 1 - 3 years and more than 3 years.
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be seen. Moreover, the wages and salaries supplement measures gross earnings but provides no
means of quantifying the value of employer or employee contributions to social insurance, implying
that one cannot distinguish formal from informal wage and salary work from this data source.
5 Estimation
The structural parameters of the model were estimated by a simulated pseudo-method of moments
procedure as follows. A reduced form model was estimated to recover values of y for each individ-
ual in the population, as well as the distributions GF (x |y ) and GI (x |y ). With this information,
careers were simulated as follows. Starting from unemployment, the individual receives self em-
ployment offers, formal job offers and informal job offers, and accepts or refuses them according
the behavior dictated by the value functions in section 3. When self employed, formally employed
or informally employed, job destruction shocks arrive with probabilities λ0, λF and λI respectively.
Each individual’s transitions and wages were repeatedly simulated until the simulations converged
to a stable share of the population in each labor market state and stable wage distributions within
the formal and informal employment states. The structural parameters of the model were adjusted
until the steady state shares in each labor market state and the steady state wage distributions
matched those found in the data, at which point the model was considered to have converged.
It is important to stress that the full structural model was not estimated, meaning that the
parameters and the distribution of y variables recovered is robust to certain functional form as-
sumptions.16 The simulations do exploit the functional forms of expressions 1, 2, 3 and 4, and
the productivity draws are assumed to come from logistic distributions. However, the steady state
version of the model is not solved analytically nor is it structurally estimated.17 It is also worth
noting that the income variables used in the estimation are those drawn from a data source that
reflects annual incomes rather than monthly, weekly or hourly earnings. The absence of data on
earnings in self employment prevented us from using the Malaysian LFS for all individuals, and
mixing data sources for measurement of a single variable is not good practice.
The remainder of this section describes how each of the steps was performed.
5.1 Direct recovery of parameters and population moments
There are several key parameters of the model that can be directly recovered from the data.
16This is not meant to imply that the estimation is fully non-parametric; in particular, a Heckman-type selection
correction is employed in the estimation of y, implying joint normality between the disturbance term of the expression
that determines Y and that which determines the probability of self employment; see section 5.2 for details.
17See Margolis et al. (2011) for the full structural estimation.
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• τ , the payroll tax rate for workers in the formal sector. As mentioned in section 4.1, the
Household Income Survey (HIS) data allows for separate measurement of gross compensation
and and employer contributions to social insurance. It is therefore straightforward to calculate
τ =
Total Compensation Cost
Gross Compensation
− 1 = 0.123.
• Share of population in each employment state (Unemployment, Formal Employment, Informal
Employment and Self Employment). As mentioned in section 4, the HIS does not allow for
the identification of unemployment while the Labor Force Survey (LFS) does not allow one
to distinguish formal from informal wage and salaried employment. However, the estimation
strategy only requires the shares of the active population in each employment state, not
the identification of the employment state for any particular individual. Accordingly, the
shares in unemployment (0.0202), self employment (0.2140) and wage and salary employment
(0.76857) were calculated directly from the LFS. The share of wage and salary employment
that is in the formal sector (0.6451) was calculated directly from the HIS. This latter share
was multiplied by the share in wage and salary employment to obtain the population share
in formal employment (0.4940) and the share in informal employment (0.2717).
• Mean and variance of log earnings in the formal, informal and self employment sectors. These
values were calculated directly from the HIS data, with the following results.
Table 3: Moments of Earnings Distributions, by Sector
Sector Mean Standard Deviation
Self Employed 9.436 1.069
Formal 10.001 0.716
Informal 9.640 0.901
5.2 Recovery of y for All Sampled Individuals
According to the model, individuals in self employment earn the value of their type, yi. This implies
that one can use observed income of those in self employment to characterize the determinants of
an individual’s type, and use this estimation to recover an estimate of the (unobserved) type for
each person in the rest of the population, namely the unemployed and those in wage and salary
employment.
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Worker type is assumed to be a function of observed characteristics18 Zi, i.e.
yi = Ziγ (8)
However, we further assume that there can be idiosyncratic shocks that affect the income an
individual draws from her self employment at a point in time, and these shocks can be written as
ν ∼ N (0, σν). This implies that the income equation from self employment takes on a standard
Mincerian form, namely
wSEi = yi + νi = Ziγ + νi (9)
As suggested by section 3, being observed in employment is the result of an optimization decision
conditional on benefits received in unemployment, the income drawn from self employment, the
riskiness of self employment, the likelihood of getting a formal or informal sector job offer and the
wages and job stability associated with those offers. This implies that the set of individuals actually
observed in self employment is a selected sample, so estimation of equation 9 requires a correction
for selection bias. The selection into self employment is thus modeled as a function of observables19
A, and we adopt the standard Heckman (1979) formulation for estimation of the vector γ. The
results of this estimation are found in table 9 in the appendix. These results are used to estimate
the value of of y for all individuals in the sample, including those not observed in self employment.
5.3 Estimation of the distributions of sector specific productivity draws GI (x |y )
and GF (x |y )
The distributions Gj (x |y ) , with j ∈ {Formal, Informal} , are assumed to be logistic with mean
equal to y + k˜j , where k˜j is a form of unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity that shifts
the mean of the x distribution. It is assumed that k˜j is a Bernoulli-distributed random variable.
Recovering these distributions (one each for formal and informal wage employment) requires four
step procedure:
1. Using the same determinants of wages as were used in the recovery of y from the self employed,
estimate the part of wages that is not due to y;
2. Recover the part of this residual that is explainable by “unobserved” characteristics, and use
this to characterize the distribution of the heterogeneity component k˜j ;
18The explanatory variables included in Z that determine human capital are the highest degree obtained (7 levels),
sex, age, age squared and indicators for the state of residence (16 levels).
19The variables included in the A vector are limited by the relatively limited set of variables available in the LFS
and HIS. Accordingly, the A vector includes the same variables as in Z, plus marital status (5 levels) and relation to
household head (10 levels).
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3. Recover the value of the draw that is added to the mean y + k˜j ; and
4. Calculate the distribution of these draws.
One first needs to estimate the relation between wages and y.20 Since wages are not observed for
each individual in every sector, recovery of the distributions of x begins with estimation of sector
specific Mincer equations.21 This estimation represents the first step in recovery of the unobserved
heterogeneity and x distributions.
The first-stage residuals of these Mincer regressions are decomposed into a component that is
explainable by the full set of variables, including the instruments that are considered “unobserv-
ables” for the purposes of the wage equation, and an orthogonal second-stage residual component.
The expected first-stage residuals are divided into two groups at the median. The average pre-
dicted residual for each subgroup is calculated, the mean for the smaller half of the observations
is subtracted from the expected wage resulting from the first stage regression (to normalize the
support of the kj distribution to 0 and a positive value) and their difference becomes the estimator
of kj ,
22 each of which occurs (by construction) with probability 0.5.
The result of these calculations is a distribution (centered around y or y+ kj) of means for the
draws from the x distribution. Subtracting this mean from the observed wage gives an estimator of
the value of the draw from the x distribution.23 The variance of the estimators for each distribution
20In the model outlined in section 3, the wage is the result of Nash bargaining over the surplus of the employment
relation between the employer and the individual. The surplus is a proportional to x, and the result of the bargaining
gives a share of the surplus to the individual in the form a wage that must exceed the individual’s outside option.
These expressions imply that the relation between the wage and x is linear; see Margolis et al. (2011) for details.
Since w = a+ bx, where a and b are unknown parameters, E (x) = E(w)
b
− a
b
and var (x) = var(w)
b2
. Since this paper
does not need to provide a structural interpretation to the intercept or slope parameters of the linear relation in order
to apply the simulation estimator, one can simply recover the mean and variance of the distribution of w, which will
themselves be linear functions of the underlying (and unknown) mean and variance of x, and use these estimated
parameters in the simulations.
21Note that although selection into employment in each sector is an issue, as it was for self employment, there
exist no valid exclusion restrictions for estimating a selection corrected mincer equation. This is because the wage
is the result of bargaining between the worker and employer, whereas in self employment it was only a function
of the individual’s type and a shock. The bargaining dimension implies that wage outcome will depend on the
value of the surplus, which itself is a function of all of the same factors that determine selection into one sector or
the other. This dependence is modeled as affecting the distribution of k˜j , namely P
(
k˜j = 0
)
= 1 − Φ (Aiκj) and
P
(
k˜j = kj
)
= Φ (Aiκj). The estimation of the sector specific Mincer equations can thus be written as w
j
i = Ziγ
j+νji .
The results of these models are found in table 10 in the appendix.
22The estimates are kF = 3.167 ∗ 10−3 and kI = 1.407 ∗ 10−4.
23More precisely, as noted in equations 6 and 7, the wage is a linear transformation of the (rescaled) reservation
utility and a draw from the x distribution. As the reservation utility depends on the expected wage, which is a
function of y+ kj , the draw of x can be approximated by the difference between the observed wage and y+ kj . This
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is calculated and converted into a scale parameter for each sector’s distribution of x draws. For
the formal sector, this gives 20.726 as the variance of the logistically distributed shock, or a scale
parameter for a logistic distribution of
√
3var(x)
pi2
= 2.510 and for the informal sector this gives
20.227 as the variance of logistically distributed shock and a scale factor of
√
3var(x)
pi2
= 2.480.
5.4 Recovery of the remaining parameters by simulated pseudo method of mo-
ments
The simulation focuses on a sample of 500 individuals drawn from the distributions of yi and xi
24 as
estimated in the previous section, where i indexes the individual and s the sector (formal, informal,
or self employment). Figure 2 describes the distribution of y in the population. At the beginning of
the simulation all workers are unemployed and the number of vacancies is equal to the number of
unemployed. As noted in section 3.1, the matching function m (θ) = aθβ determines the probability
of an individual meeting a vacancy, with θ being the ratio of vacancies to unemployment (i.e. a
measure of labor market tightness). Contracts are only agreed upon when both profits are positive
and the flow value of a given job offer is higher than the value of unemployment.
Figure 2: Distribution of y in the Population
The micro simulation model follows over time (monthly) each of the individuals in the sam-
ple, who are characterized by yi and xi. Through aggregation, the model generates steady state
distributions for variables of interest: the current unemployment rate in Malaysia; the shares of
approximation is best when β = 1.
24For consistency in the simulations, the productivity draws x are assumed to be the same across firms within the
same sector for a given individual.
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informal, formal, and self employment; as well as the mean and variance of the log of earnings for
each type of job. To conduct policy simulations, we have to estimate 7 parameters in order to match
these distributions. The parameters are: job destruction rates (3); the share of informal vacancies;
the arrival rate of job opportunities for self employment; the bargaining power coefficient; and the
scale factor in the matching function. The identification of the model parameters is based on the
minimization of the following function in the absence of an unemployment benefit system:25
3∑
j=1
(
sj − s∗j
)2
+
(
wj − w∗j
)2
+
(
vj − v∗j
)2
(10)
where sj is the share of the labor force working in sector j, wi is the average of log wages across
individuals working in the sector, vj is the variance, j=1: informal, 2:formal, 3:self employed, and
a ∗ indicates the targeted values of the variable, estimated from the data.
The values of the recovered parameters,26 conditional on the sample of individuals drawn, are
presented in Table 4.27 The model is able to closely reproduce the employment shares but predicts
higher wages for informal sector workers than found in the data, as seen in Table 5. We find job
destruction rates ranging between 1 and 5% per month, the lowest in formal sector and the highest
in the informal sector. The arrival rate of opportunities in self employment is close to 8% per
month whereas the share of informal job offers is close 40%. Finally, for the sample of individuals
drawn, workers appear to have a relatively high bargaining power (> 0.7) but below what would
be observed in a perfectly competitive market.
6 Microsimulations of Policy Experiments
Based on the estimated parameters several policy experiments were conducted to assess the labor
market impact of introducing an unemployment insurance system.
We considered 25 types of unemployment insurance systems based on variations in the values of
the following policy parameters: the replacement rate; the contribution rate to the system (assumed
to be paid by the employer); the vesting period (i.e., the number of contributions necessary to qualify
for benefits); the duration of unemployment benefits. Although the last two are inconsistent with
a literal interpretation of the model in section 3, they are nevertheless closer to situations found in
the real world. The implicit assumption here is that workers are myopic and only take into account
25The estimation uses the ANT algorithm (Miller, 1998).
26The severance pay parameter, s, is set to zero for the purposes of the simulation.
27Clearly, different samples would lead to different values for the model parameters. In principle, one could
bootstrap samples to estimate standard errors for the parameters. In the micro-simulation estimation, however, we
keep the sample of individuals constant.
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Table 4: Value of Model Parameters Estimated for the Policy Simulations
Parameter Value Description
β 0.7646 Bargaining power
a 0.5631 Scale factor in matching function
α 0.0817 Arrival of self employment opportunities
ψ 0.4 Share of informal job offers
λi 0.0477 Job destruction rate in the informal sector
λF 0.01 Job destruction rate in the formal sector
λI 0.01 Job destruction rate for the self employed
Table 5: Performance of Estimated Model
Population Moment Estimated Values Observed Value
Share informal work 0.263 0.281
Share formal work 0.538 0.511
Share self employment 0.174 0.186
Mean log-wage informal sector 10.0 9.640048
Std log wage informal 1.2 0.9005742
Mean log-wage formal sector 10.2 10.00101
Std log wage formal 0.7 0.71
Mean log-earnings self employment 9.7 9.436391
Std log-earnings self employment 1.5 1.06
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the availability of unemployment benefits in the next period when deciding whether to take a given
job offer. The simulations take as a reference situation a world without unemployment benefits,
i.e. where the payroll tax rate, replacement rate, vesting period and benefit duration are all zero.
The ranges considered for each of the parameters are summarized in Table 6. The results of
the various simulations are presented in Appendix Table 11. We also analyze the impact of the
unemployment benefit system in the case of a lower value for the bargaining coefficient, chosen to
be 0.3.28 The results of these simulations are presented in Appendix Table 12. Table 7 summarizes
the key results from these tables for employment shares, while table 8 summarizes the key results
for average earnings.
Table 6: Values of Policy Parameters for Unemployment Benefit Systems
Policy Parameter Set of Values
Contribution Rate {0,0.01,0.02,0.03,0.04,0.05}
Replacement rate {0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,1}
Vesting Period (months) {0,1,2,3,4,5,6}
Duration (months) {2,4,6,8,10,12,∞}
The results in Table 11 suggest that, in general, an unemployment benefit system based on risk-
pooling would have modest effects on labor markets, except in the case of very generous replacement
rates. The main effects would be a modest increase in the unemployment rate, the reallocation
of labor from wage employment into self employment, and an increase in the average wage in
both the formal and informal sectors. The unemployment benefit system increases the flow value
of unemployment and the flow value of formal jobs (through an increase in wages and a higher
expected income when the labor contract ends), but the first effect dominates for a high value of
the bargaining power parameter. Because the flow value of unemployment increases, individuals
receiving job offers are less likely to take them, which increases the unemployment rate. In all
cases simulated, the increase in the unemployment rate as a result of introducing unemployment
insurance is below 1 percentage point and in most cases less than or equal to 0.6 percentage points,
which is to be compared to an unemployment share of 2.02 percent in the absence of unemployment
insurance. As individuals become less likely to take job offers, unemployment rises and the labor
market tightness measure
(
θ = VU
)
falls. Other things being equal, individuals are then more likely
28Changing the value of the bargaining coefficient, of course, changes the employment shares and the distribution
of wages. The impacts of the simulated unemployment benefit systems are analyzed against this new (counterfactual)
steady state.
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Table 7: Effects of Alternative Unemployment Benefit Systems on Employment Shares
Pay Replace- Share
Roll ment Vesting Dura- Share Share Share Self
Tax Rate Period tion Unemployed Informal Formal Employed
Estimated Bargaining Power (β = 0.7646)
0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.01 0.5 6 6 0.4% -0.5% -0.3% 0.3%
0.01 0.5 6 12 0.4% -0.7% 0.0% 0.3%
0.01 0.5 2 6 0.5% -0.5% -0.3% 0.3%
0.01 0.5 5 6 0.4% -0.5% -0.3% 0.3%
0.01 0.7 6 6 0.6% -2.6% -0.6% 2.7%
0.01 0.9 6 6 1.0% -1.2% 0.3% 0.0%
0.02 0.7 6 6 0.6% -2.6% -0.6% 2.7%
0.05 0.7 6 6 0.6% -2.6% -0.8% 2.7%
0 0.5 0 0 1.8% -0.1% -1.7% 0.0%
0 1 0 0 45.9% -23.0% -26.6% 3.6%
Low Bargaining Power (β = 0.3)
0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.01 0.5 6 6 -4.3% -0.5% 12.1% -7.3%
0.01 0.5 6 12 -4.5% -0.4% 14.1% -9.2%
0.01 0.5 2 6 -4.4% -0.4% 12.5% -7.6%
0.01 0.5 5 6 -4.3% -0.5% 12.1% -7.3%
0.01 0.7 6 6 -1.9% 1.6% 6.6% -6.3%
0.01 0.9 6 6 0.3% 1.5% -1.4% -0.4%
0.02 0.7 6 6 -2.0% 1.7% 6.6% -6.3%
0.05 0.7 6 6 -1.1% 2.1% 6.4% -7.4%
0 0.5 0 0 -6.5% 4.5% 12.8% -10.8%
0 1 0 0 38.7% -12.0% -20.6% -6.2%
N.B.: Table presents the difference in steady state values between the simulated
and baseline scenarii.
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Table 8: Effects of Alternative Unemployment Benefit Systems on Average Earnings
Pay Replace- Mean Mean Mean
Roll ment Vesting Dura- Wage Wage Wage
Tax Rate Period tion Informal Formal Self Employed
Estimated Bargaining Power (β = 0.7646)
0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.01 0.5 6 6 12.3% 4.0% -4.9%
0.01 0.5 6 12 13.4% 3.8% -4.9%
0.01 0.5 2 6 12.3% 4.0% -4.9%
0.01 0.5 5 6 12.3% 4.0% -4.9%
0.01 0.7 6 6 11.3% 4.1% 3.5%
0.01 0.9 6 6 22.5% 1.7% 2.0%
0.02 0.7 6 6 11.3% 3.2% 3.5%
0.05 0.7 6 6 11.5% 0.4% 3.5%
0 0.5 0 0 24.2% 8.9% -7.0%
0 1 0 0 -86.3% -2.8% 35.8%
Low Bargaining Power (β = 0.3)
0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.01 0.5 6 6 0.6% 1.7% 1.2%
0.01 0.5 6 12 0.6% 0.9% 1.1%
0.01 0.5 2 6 0.6% 1.2% 1.1%
0.01 0.5 5 6 0.6% 1.7% 1.2%
0.01 0.7 6 6 1.1% -5.4% 0.7%
0.01 0.9 6 6 0.4% -7.4% 1.2%
0.02 0.7 6 6 1.1% -5.9% 0.6%
0.05 0.7 6 6 0.4% -10.3% 0.7%
0 0.5 0 0 0.6% -18.2% 1.3%
0 1 0 0 -40.0% 109.2% -1.1%
N.B.: Table presents the difference in steady state values between the
simulated and baseline scenarii.
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to enter self employment. The share of self employment can increase by up to 3 percentage points
in the simulations examined here.
As discussed above, the unemployment benefit system also has a direct impact on wages in
the formal sector, increasing the flow value of formal jobs and dampening the negative effect that
the increase in the flow value of unemployment has on acceptance rates. In the simulations, the
average wage in the formal sector increases by between 3 and 5 percent (more in the case of
unemployment assistance). The other important effect is the change in average earnings of self
employed workers. Because earnings in that sector only depend on the level of human capital of
the individual, changes provide information about the types of workers who are more likely to move
in or out of the sector. The results show that average earnings fall when the replacement rate of
the unemployment insurance systems is 50%, indicating that low skilled workers disproportionately
move to this sector. This also explains the increase in the average wage of the informal sector
since those leaving are more likely to be low skilled workers. Moreover, the unemployment benefit
system has an additional indirect positive effect on the wages of informal sector workers in that it
increases the flow value of unemployment through the increase in formal sector wages. When the
replacement rate is above 50%, however, average earnings for the self employed increase, indicating
an inflow of workers with higher productivity. The interpretation is that as the replacement rate
increases, the additional flow value of unemployment makes self employment attractive even for
high skilled workers - for whom the “opportunity cost of unemployment is higher”.
Overall, the effects of the unemployment benefit system become more important as the re-
placement rate increases. However, there are no systematic effects from changes in the duration of
benefits or the vesting period. This is likely to be an artifact of the current simulations. Indeed,
we have run only one set of random shocks that affect individuals over time. Because individuals
can be in different states at time t in different policy simulations, the individual specific shock at
time t (which is the same for a given individual across simulations) sometimes determines whether
a job offer is made and sometimes whether a job is destroyed. For instance, the share of formal
employment can change because initial changes in behavior put individuals on a stochastic path
where they receive fewer formal job offers.
The contribution rate also appears to have only a marginal impact on the unemployment rate
and employment shares, at least when kept below 5 percent. It does, however, considerably dampen
the increase in the average formal sector wage. Indeed, the main effect of the contribution rate is
to reduce the wage paid for a given skill level, meaning that firms pass at least part of the cost
of additional payroll taxes through to the worker in the form of lower wages. Other things being
equal, this reduces the likelihood of taking formal sector jobs but not enough to have substantial
effects on employment shares.
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Lowering the bargaining power of workers, as seen by Table 12, changes the results considerably.
As indicated above, introducing UI reduces the likelihood of individual accepting informal job offers
or opportunities for self employment. However, those receiving formal job offers are this time more
likely to take them, and formal sector wages rise under UI. When the bargaining power of workers
(β) falls, formal sector wages also fall. However, introducing a UI system induces a larger increase
in formal sector wages when bargaining power is low than when it is high. This is because the
bargaining process puts more weight on the flow value of unemployment (relative to the flow value
of employment) when bargaining power is low than when it is high, so a given change in the flow
value of unemployment leaders to a larger increase in the formal wage, and thereby the value
of formal employment, than in the situation with a higher bargaining power for workers. As a
result, we see a larger increase in the share of formal employment and a larger reduction in self
employment across the simulations (except in the case of very generous unemployment assistance)
when β is lower. This result, although not directly relevant for Malaysia, points to the importance
that unemployment benefit systems can have in non-competitive labor markets where employers
have more bargaining power relative to workers.
As noted in footnote 7, the model assumes that the state can enforce eligibility rules and
ensure that only the unemployed can draw UI benefits. Relaxing this assumption so as to allow
those employed in the informal sector (either in wage or self employment) to draw benefits would
have both direct and indirect effects on the model’s outcomes. The direct effect of allowing UI
receipt while in the informal sector is that the value of informal sector jobs and self employment is
increased since at least with some probability benefits can be drawn while working. The value of
unemployment also increases since part of the benefits can continue to be drawn if the individual
exits unemployment into an informal sector job. Another, indirect, effect of relaxing the assumption
is that formal sector employment becomes more valuable, as the level of unemployment benefits
which enters the value function increases. Presumably, therefore, workers would be less likely to
remain unemployed and more likely to work in any sector, shortening unemployment durations.
Without formally estimating this more complex model, however, it is impossible to quantify how
much the share in each employment state would change as enforcement is weakened.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type of macro labor market model to
analyze the effects of introducing unemployment insurance. Although the application focuses in
Malaysia, the results are likely to be relevant for other middle income countries. The model has
four labor market states (unemployment, self employment, informal wage employment and formal
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wage employment) and was estimated to replicate the structure of the labor market in Malaysia in
2009 and the distribution of earnings for informal, formal and self employed workers. The model
is estimated using direct techniques, OLS regression, selection-corrected regression and simulated
pseudo method of moments estimators on data from Malaysia in 2009.
The model is then used to simulate the effects of alternative unemployment benefit system
designs that depend on the replacement rate, the vesting period for benefits, the duration of benefits,
and the contribution rate. The results suggest that introducing an unemployment insurance system
in Malaysia would have only a modest negative effect on unemployment if benefits are not overly
generous. The model suggests that a UI system would induce a reallocation of labor from wage into
self employment while increasing average wages in the formal and informal sectors. The effects on
the average earnings of the self employed would depend on the generosity of the system. With a
50% replacement rate, most workers entering self employment would be low skilled workers, driving
average earnings down. High skilled workers would move into self employment with more generous
systems, thereby increasing average earnings.
Although outcomes appear unaffected by variations in the vesting period needed to obtain
benefits, and only slightly affected by changes in the duration of benefits, they do vary with the
payroll tax rate, the replacement rate and worker bargaining power. The model suggests that these
variations are due to workers changing their behavior in response to changes in the flow value of
formal employment (both directly - for those coming from the formal sector - and indirectly for the
others) and the flow value of unemployment.
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A Basic Structure of the Model
Our model considers a labor market with salaried and self employed workers in the spirit of Albrecht
et al. (2009). Wage workers can produce with firms offering either a formal or an informal contract.
That is, firms can create vacancies in the formal or the informal sector. While formal contracts are
subject to labor market regulations like payroll taxes τ , informal contracts are not directly affected
by labor market policy. It is also assumed that matches in the informal sector produce a flow value
of output which is a fraction  < 1 of what the same match would yield with a formal contract.29
The parameter  can be interpreted for example as the expected cost of a fine for not complying
with regulations. Even though we allow for two types of vacancies for wage jobs, we maintain
the assumption that search is random. That is, letting φ denote the fraction of informal sector
vacancies, the effective contact rate for informal and formal vacancies for the worker are φm (θ)
and (1− φ)m (θ), respectively, where θ = Vacancies
Unemployment
is a measure of labor market tightness
and m (·) is a standard matching function.
Worker participation in the different sectors will be related to, but will not depend exclusively
on, the worker’s type. We assume an exogenous distribution, y ∼ F (y), y ≤ y ≤ y, of types across
workers.
Self employed workers receive an income y equivalent to their type. Opportunities to work in
the self employment sector arrive to the unemployed at exogenous Poisson rate α, and employment
ends at exogenous Poisson rate λ0.
We allow for ex post idiosyncratic initial match productivity in both wage sectors. When a
worker of type y meets a prospective employer with a vacancy, she draws a match-specific produc-
tivity, x ∼ Gi(x|y), x ≤ x ≤ x, where the subscript i ∈ {F, I} indicates whether the job is in the
formal or informal sector. In order to relate x with y, we assume first-order stochastic dominance,
i.e., y′ > y => Gi(x|y′) < Gi(x|y) like in Albrecht et al. (2010). This means that the higher the
value of the worker type indicator y, the greater her expected productivity. Once x is realized,
the parties decide to produce if the net surplus of the match is positive and continue searching
otherwise. The match surplus, and thereby the negotiated wage, depend both on the productivity
x and on the worker’s type.
As an attractive feature of the model, note that there is not perfect segmentation of large groups
of workers across the sectors given that match productivity not only depends on the worker’s type
but also on match-specific characteristics. It is thus possible to have workers with employment
histories in the three sectors as reflected in the data for many developing countries.
29A similar assumption is done in Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009).
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B Regression Results
28
Table 9: Results From Estimation of y
Selection Into
VARIABLES log(Self Employment Income) Self Employment
SPM/SPVM 0.368*** -0.221***
(0.0289) (0.0204)
STPM/HSC/STA 0.696*** -0.424***
(0.0648) (0.0435)
Sijil 0.578*** -0.383***
(0.0876) (0.0647)
Diploma 1.096*** -0.509***
(0.0592) (0.0358)
Advanced Degree 1.558*** -0.629***
(0.0694) (0.0367)
No Degree -0.343*** 0.239***
(0.0282) (0.0209)
Female -0.646*** -0.140***
(0.0244) (0.0252)
Age 0.0762*** 0.0158***
(0.00655) (0.00473)
Age2 -0.0950*** 0.0144***
(0.00697) (0.00556)
Constant 9.249*** -1.913***
(0.220) (0.0992)
atanh (ρ) -0.783***
(0.0744)
log (σ) 0.0280
(0.0311)
Observations 63,817 63,817
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NB: Main and selection models also include controls for 16 states. Selection model includes
controls for 10 relations to household head and 5 marital statuses
29
Table 10: Mincer Regressions for Wage and Salary Sectors
VARIABLES Formal Informal
SPM/SPVM 0.263*** 0.369***
-0.01 (0.0143)
STPM/HSC/STA 0.456*** 0.668***
-0.0175 (0.0277)
Sijil 0.493*** 0.646***
-0.0203 (0.0377)
Diploma 0.729*** 1.086***
-0.0124 (0.0203)
Advanced Degree 1.126*** 1.351***
-0.0123 (0.0192)
No Degree -0.199*** -0.256***
-0.0129 (0.0156)
Female -0.268*** -0.311***
-0.00618 (0.0101)
Age 0.0911*** 0.122***
-0.00203 (0.00271)
Age2 -0.0911*** -0.129***
-0.00272 (0.00349)
Constant 7.765*** 6.998***
-0.0379 (0.0526)
Observations 30,563 20,070
R2 0.486 0.469
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NB: Models also includes controls for 16 states.
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